pypi package report

Is ouroboros-ai safe?

2 known vulnerabilities, worst severity HIGH.

// reach

25 direct dependencies

10 carry known advisories, worst CRITICAL

0 packages depend on it

an advisory here reaches each of them

    Create a free accountfor every dependency path, dependent and what to upgrade
    // ai model usage

    No published models are known to use this package.


    cvss
    7.5
    high

    severity band, no base score published

    epss
    not scored

    chance of exploitation in 30 days

    xyz score
    3.8
    low

    CyberXYZ composite out of 10

    fig. 01 — GHSA-jv2h-4p9v-wf5w, the advisory selected below

    // 2 advisories

    GHSA-jv2h-4p9v-wf5w

    HIGHGitHub rating
    // impact

    The CVE-2026-47211 fix (0.39.0) added _UNTRUSTED_ENV_DENYLIST to stop an untrusted project-directory .env from redirecting execution. The denylist was incomplete — several execution-routing keys of the same RCE class were omitted, so a malicious cloned repo can still reach arbitrary command execution by shipping a .env (auto-loaded at import, no review step):

    • Backend config-home roots CODEX_HOME, OPENCODE_CONFIG, OPENCODE_CONFIG_DIR, XDG_CONFIG_HOME: a spawned vendor CLI resolves its config from these. CODEX_HOME=./.evil + committed ./.evil/config.toml redirects the nested Codex agent to attacker config — mcp_servers.<name>.command/args (RCE) and approval_policy="never" / sandbox_mode="danger-full-access" (silent removal of the human approval gate). (reported by matte1782)
    • MCP bridge / plugin execution roster OUROBOROS_MCP_CONFIG (the YAML's server command/args are spawned via stdio_client — RCE), OUROBOROS_PLUGIN_LOCKFILE, OUROBOROS_PLUGIN_TRUST_ROOT (redirect the installed-plugin roster / trust root so ooo <name> dispatches into attacker code). (reported by hackkim)
    • SSRF guard toggle OUROBOROS_ALLOW_LOCAL_TRANSPORT (re-enables loopback/private MCP transport targets).
    • Instruction / capability roots OUROBOROS_AGENTS_DIR, COPILOT_CUSTOM_INSTRUCTIONS_DIRS (replace spawned sub-agent role prompts), OUROBOROS_RUNTIME_PROFILE (backend selector), OUROBOROS_TOOL_CAPABILITIES (override YAML can lower a tool's approval_class, weakening the approval gate).

    Additionally, the MCP bridge auto-loaded ./.ouroboros/mcp_servers.yaml from the working directory (create_bridge_from_env(cwd=Path.cwd())), so running ooo inside a malicious repo spawned the committed roster's command — RCE with no .env at all. (cwd-branch noted by hackkim)

    // patches

    Fixed in 0.42.1. All listed keys were added to _UNTRUSTED_ENV_DENYLIST; the cwd auto-discovery branch was removed (only the explicit OUROBOROS_MCP_CONFIG env var and ~/.ouroboros/mcp_servers.yaml remain, both trusted). The regression suite now derives from the source denylist to prevent future drift.

    // workarounds

    Do not run Ouroboros from an untrusted/cloned repository directory; remove any project-directory .env and ./.ouroboros/mcp_servers.yaml before running.

    // credit

    Reported privately via coordinated disclosure by matte1782 and hackkim (https://github.com/hackkim).


    Checked 2026-11-08 at 00:02 UTC. The most recent advisory here was published 2026-06-19. Updated continuously from NVD, GHSA, OSV and CNA feeds.

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