When performing aggregate queries, Ormar ORM constructs SQL expressions by passing user-supplied column names directly into sqlalchemy.text() without any validation or sanitization. The min() and max() methods in the QuerySet class accept arbitrary string input as the column parameter. While sum() and avg() are partially protected by an is_numeric type check that rejects non-existent fields, min() and max() skip this validation entirely. As a result, an attacker-controlled string is embedded as raw SQL inside the aggregate function call. Any unauthorized user can exploit this vulnerability to read the entire database contents, including tables unrelated to the queried model, by injecting a subquery as the column parameter.
// affected versions0.9.9 - 0.12.2 0.20.0b1 - 0.22.0 (latest)
The vulnerable SelectAction.get_text_clause() method and the min()/max() aggregate functions were introduced together in commit ff9d412 (March 12, 2021) and first released in version 0.9.9. The vulnerable code has never been modified since — get_text_clause() is identical in every subsequent version through the latest 0.21.0.
Versions prior to 0.9.9 do not contain the min()/max() aggregate feature and are not affected.
The following uses the latest ormar 0.21.0 as an example to illustrate the attack.
// vulnerability detailsWhen performing an aggregate query, the QuerySet.max() method (line 721, queryset.py) passes user input to _query_aggr_function(). This method creates a SelectAction object for each column name. The column string is split by __ and the last part becomes self.field_name — with no validation against the model's actual fields.
The critical vulnerability is in SelectAction.get_text_clause() (line 41-43, select_action.py), which directly passes self.field_name into sqlalchemy.text():
#select_action.py line 41-43
def get_text_clause(self) -> sqlalchemy.sql.expression.TextClause:
alias = f"{self.table_prefix}_" if self.table_prefix else ""
return sqlalchemy.text(f"{alias}{self.field_name}") # unsanitised user input!The apply_func() method then wraps this raw text clause inside func.max(), producing SQL like max(<attacker_input>). Since sqlalchemy.text() treats its argument as literal SQL, any subquery or SQL expression injected through the column name will be executed by the database engine.
The _query_aggr_function() method (line 704-719, queryset.py) only validates field types for sum and avg, leaving min and max completely unprotected:
#queryset.py line 704-719
async def _query_aggr_function(self, func_name: str, columns: List) -> Any:
func = getattr(sqlalchemy.func, func_name)
select_actions = [
SelectAction(select_str=column, model_cls=self.model) for column in columns
]
if func_name in ["sum", "avg"]: # <-- only sum/avg are checked!
if any(not x.is_numeric for x in select_actions):
raise QueryDefinitionError(...)
select_columns = [x.apply_func(func, use_label=True) for x in select_actions]
expr = self.build_select_expression().alias(f"subquery_for_{func_name}")
expr = sqlalchemy.select(*select_columns).select_from(expr)
result = await self.database.fetch_one(expr)
return dict(result) if len(result) > 1 else result[0]To reproduce the attack, you can follow the steps below, using a FastAPI application with SQLite as an example.
Note: The PoC consists of two files provided in the attachments — poc_server.py (the vulnerable server) and poc_attacker.py (the HTTP-based attacker script). Start the vulnerable application
Install dependencies:
pip install ormar databases aiosqlite fastapi uvicorn httpx
The vulnerable server (poc_server.py) is based on the official ormar FastAPI example (ormar/examples/fastapi_quick_start.py). The only modification is the addition of a /items/stats endpoint — a common pattern for applications that provide aggregate statistics. This demonstrates that the vulnerability is easily triggered by natural API design.
The server defines three models:
Category and Item — from the official ormar example (unchanged) AdminUser — simulates internal data (e.g., an admin_users table) that should NOT be accessible through the public API
The vulnerable endpoint:
// see: <https://collerek.github.io/ormar/queries/aggregations/>@app.get("/items/stats") async def item_stats( metric: str = Query("max", description="max or min"), column: str = Query("price", description="Column to aggregate"), ): """Return aggregate statistics for items.""" if metric == "max": result = await Item.objects.max(column) elif metric == "min": result = await Item.objects.min(column) else: return {"error": "Unsupported metric"} return {"metric": metric, "column": column, "result": result}
The database contains:
Table | Data -- | -- categories | Electronics items | Laptop ($999.99), Phone ($699.99), Tablet ($449.99), Monitor ($329.99) admin_users | root / Sup3r$ecretP@ss! / ak-9f8e7d6c5b4a3210-prod | deploy-bot / ghp_Tx7KmR29vLp4QzN1bWcA3sYjDf80Ue5Xoi / ak-1a2b3c4d5e6f7890-ci
The admin_users table is NOT exposed via any API endpoint. The attack steps The PoC requires two terminals: Terminal 1 — Start the vulnerable server: python poc_server.py
Terminal 2 — Run the attacker script: python poc_attacker.py
The attacker script (poc_attacker.py) sends HTTP requests to the running server. It has NO prior knowledge of the database schema — all information is discovered through the injection. The attacker executes 6 progressive attack stages through the single /items/stats endpoint. Principle of vulnerability exploitation
- The attacker confirms injection by sending an arithmetic expression
The attacker sends GET /items/stats?metric=max&column=1+1. The data flow is: HTTP request: GET /items/stats?metric=max&column=1+1 ↓ item_stats(metric="max", column="1+1") # poc_server.py ↓ Item.objects.max("1+1") # queryset.py:721 ↓ _query_aggr_function(func_name="max", columns=["1+1"]) # queryset.py:704 ↓ SelectAction(select_str="1+1", model_cls=Item) # select_action.py:22 ↓ _split_value_into_parts("1+1") → self.field_name = "1+1" ↓
// min/max skip the is_numeric check (line 709 only checks sum/avg)↓ get_text_clause() → sqlalchemy.text("1+1") # select_action.py:43 ↓ apply_func(sqlalchemy.func.max) → max(1+1)
Generated SQL: SELECT max(1+1) AS "1+1" FROM (SELECT items.id AS id, items.name AS name, items.price AS price, items.category AS category FROM items) AS subquery_for_max
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High