pypi package report

Is local-operator safe?

2 known vulnerabilities, worst severity CRITICAL.

// reach

0 direct dependencies

none carry a known advisory

    0 packages depend on it

    an advisory here reaches each of them

      Create a free accountfor every dependency path, dependent and what to upgrade
      // ai model usage

      No published models are known to use this package.


      cvss
      0.0
      critical

      severity band, no base score published

      epss
      not scored

      chance of exploitation in 30 days

      xyz score
      0.0
      medium

      CyberXYZ composite out of 10

      fig. 01 — GHSA-22mg-8gw7-636x, the advisory selected below

      // 2 advisories

      GHSA-22mg-8gw7-636x

      CRITICAL

      The /v1/agents/import endpoint and AgentRegistry.importagent() in local-operator versions before 0.47.5 trust the id field inside agent.yml of an uploaded agent profile archive when constructing the destination directory. A crafted id containing directory traversal sequences makes shutil.rmtree and shutil.copy2 operate outside the agent registry, allowing an unauthenticated client with network access to the API to recursively delete arbitrary directories and write files with the privileges of the server process. Even without traversal, an imported archive could overwrite or delete existing local agent profiles.

      Version 0.47.5 assigns a fresh server-generated identifier to every imported profile, never derives a filesystem path from archive metadata, creates destination directories exclusively, and binds lop serve to 127.0.0.1 by default.


      Checked 2026-10-01 at 23:56 UTC. The most recent advisory here was published 2026-09-05. Updated continuously from NVD, GHSA, OSV and CNA feeds.

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