Is geolens-cli safe?

GHSA-p23g-mvhj-jh3j

Multiple GeoLens read/link endpoints authorized only the resource named in the request URL (a map, a VRT, a source dataset, an AI request) and failed to re-authorize a second, caller-influenced dataset that the request reached through a relationship, layer reference, mosaic source, or request body. This "authorize the URL resource, read a different dataset un-re-authorized" pattern let callers read data from datasets they have no access to.

The most severe instances require no authentication at all (anonymous, network-only). Others require only the default editor role that any self-service signup / upload user receives.

All issues are fixed in 1.2.3. There is no complete configuration workaround — upgrading is the only full remediation.

Depending on the endpoint, an attacker can read, for datasets they cannot otherwise access:

• the dataset's vector tile data (actual feature geometries/attributes),
• the dataset's raster pixels,
• backing-table rows,
• and metadata — table name, column schema, feature count, extent, source

URL/filename, contacts, and sampled row values.

All versions prior to 1.2.3 (includes the published 1.0.0, 1.2.0, and 1.2.2 releases and their PyPI/npm/GHCR artifacts). Fixed in 1.2.3.

1. Anonymous metadata + private vector-tile disclosure via public maps (PR #235) GET /maps/{id} and GET /maps/{id}/style.json authorized the map but not each layer's backing dataset. A public map that references a private dataset leaked that dataset's table name, column schema, feature count, extent, and sampled values to anonymous callers. style.json additionally returned a vector-tile URL carrying an HMAC signature bound to neither user nor map, which the tile endpoint accepts for non-public datasets with no user check — so the signature is replayable to read the private dataset's actual vector tiles. (Anonymous · High)

2. Anonymous private-row disclosure via dataset relationships (PR #234) The dataset FK-relationship APIs authorized only the source dataset from the URL, never the relationship target. A public dataset with a relationship to a private dataset let an anonymous caller enumerate the relationship (obtaining the private target's id/title and the relationship id) and then call the related-record endpoint to read rows from the private target's backing table. (Anonymous · High)

3. Anonymous metadata disclosure via OGC externalId lookup (PR #236) GET /collections/datasets/items?externalId= resolved the dataset by id and returned the full OGC catalog record (title, summary, bbox, keywords, contacts, distributions, source org) with no visibility check — the user was never threaded into the lookup. An anonymous caller could read any private, restricted, or unpublished dataset's metadata by UUID. (Anonymous · High)

4. Cross-tenant raster pixel disclosure via VRT mosaics — SEC-C (PR #237) An authenticated user with the default editor upload permission could mosaic another user's private raster into a VRT they own, then read the victim's pixels back through raster tile / quicklook / COG endpoints that authorize only the attacker-owned VRT. VRT member pixels are compiled into one served asset and cannot be filtered at read time, so the fix authorizes every source dataset at write/link time. (Authenticated editor · High)

5. Cross-tenant metadata/sample-data disclosure via AI metadata endpoints — SEC-D (PR #238) The POST /ai/metadata/{summary,keywords,lineage,quality-statement} endpoints were gated only by the useaichat permission (held by the default editor role). The attacker-controlled datasetid in the request body flowed into the LLM prompt context with no visibility filter, rendering any dataset's title, summary, source URL, filename, column schema, and sample values into the response. (Authenticated editor · High)

6. Residual VRT member disclosure for legacy links — SEC-E (PR #237) Link-time authorization (finding 4) does not re-authorize pre-existing vrtsourcelinks, so legacy or authorization-drift links still leaked member metadata and health via the VRT source-listing/status endpoints until a per-member read filter was added. (Medium)

Fixed in 1.2.3 by, in order:

• 31a103b9 — fix(catalog): authorize relationship targets in related-record endpoints (#234)
• 01bc87da — fix(maps): re-authorize each layer's dataset on anonymous map read endpoints (#235)
• 407c0688 — fix(ogc): enforce dataset visibility on the externalId OGC item lookup (#236)
• 2c031da8 — fix(vrt): authorize VRT source datasets at link time + filter unauthorized members on read (#237)
• 07dfb1c6 — fix(ai): authorize the requested dataset on AI metadata endpoints (#238)

The fixes follow the codebase's established per-dataset re-authorization pattern (canaccessdataset / checkdatasetaccessoranonymous), filtering at read time and authorizing cross-dataset references at link/write time.

There is no complete configuration workaround; the anonymous findings require only network access to the API. Operators who cannot upgrade immediately should restrict network exposure of the API and avoid co-locating private datasets with public maps/relationships, but upgrading to 1.2.3 is the only full remediation.

Upgrade to GeoLens 1.2.3:

• Container images: ghcr.io/geolens-io/geolens-api:1.2.3 (+ worker/frontend)
• Python SDK: geolens==1.2.3 · CLI: geolens-cli==1.2.3 · npm: @geolens/sdk@1.2.3