pypi package report

Is docling-slim safe?

2 known vulnerabilities, worst severity MODERATE.

// reach

64 direct dependencies

19 carry known advisories, worst CRITICAL

6 packages depend on it

an advisory here reaches each of them

  • cognee
  • conexus
Create a free accountfor every dependency path, dependent and what to upgrade
// ai model usage

No published models are known to use this package.


cvss
0.0
medium

severity out of 10

epss
not scored

chance of exploitation in 30 days

xyz score
not scored

CyberXYZ composite out of 10

fig. 01 — GHSA-q43m-vhcp-mhvm, the advisory selected below

// 2 advisories

GHSA-q43m-vhcp-mhvm

MODERATECVE-2026-105750
// summary

When the HTML backend renders pages in a headless browser (HTMLBackendOptions(renderpage=True)), the enablelocalfetch option is not enforced. A crafted HTML file can embed an arbitrary local file (for example with ), and that file's contents appear in the page image attached to the returned DoclingDocument.

// details

In render mode, Playwright requests are filtered by HTMLDocumentBackend.getbrowserrequestblockreason. In affected versions, this check allowed file: URLs unconditionally, before reading any option. As a result:

  • enablelocalfetch=False did not block local file access, and
  • even with enablelocalfetch=True, file access was not limited to the source document's directory, unlike the non-render path (ImageResourceLoader), which rejects absolute paths and path traversal.

Versions 2.82.0–2.90.x did no request filtering in render mode at all.

The browser runs with JavaScript disabled (from 2.91.0), so disclosure is passive: only what Chromium renders visibly inside the page viewport ends up in the page image.

Only Path inputs are affected. They are loaded through a file:// URL. Stream inputs are loaded with page.setcontent() into an opaque origin, from which Chromium does not load file:// subresources.

// impact

An attacker who can submit HTML for conversion can read any text file the conversion process can read (for example .env files, credential files, or other users' documents on a shared host) by having it rendered into the page image.

Only applications that meet all of these conditions are affected:

  • they set HTMLBackendOptions(renderpage=True) in Python,
  • they have the optional playwright dependency installed, and
  • they pass untrusted HTML as a filesystem Path.

The following are not affected: the default configuration (renderpage=False), the docling CLI, docling-serve, and the EPUB, Markdown, XBRL and email backends.

// patches

Fixed in 2.118.1 (#3948). In render mode, file: requests are now blocked unless enablelocalfetch=True, and allowed requests are limited to the source document's directory.

// workarounds

If you can't upgrade, don't use renderpage=True on untrusted HTML, or pass the input as a stream instead of a Path.

// credits

Reported by @priyankn.

// cvss v3.1 vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Checked 2026-10-06 at 18:33 UTC. The most recent advisory here was published 2026-10-06. Updated continuously from NVD, GHSA, OSV and CNA feeds.

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