Is copier safe?

GHSA-9gmc-jqmh-3rvm

In copier >= 9.5.0, <= 9.15.1, the trust setting's prefix match (copier/_settings.py) compares the template URL against a trusted prefix with a raw str.startswith and no path normalization, while the URL is normalized when the template is actually fetched (Path.resolve() for local paths; libcurl dot-segment removal for https). A template reference that textually starts with a trusted prefix but contains .. (e.g. https://github.com/trusted-org/../attacker-org/repo.git) is therefore granted trust yet resolves to a different, attacker-controlled template, whose tasks / migrations / jinja_extensions then run without the --trust prompt — arbitrary command execution. Likely CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname) in the trust check leading to CWE-94 (code execution).

trust lets users mark template locations as trusted so copier skips the unsafe-feature gate. A trailing / makes an entry a prefix match (docs/settings.md: "Locations ending with / will be matched as prefixes, trusting all templates from that location").

copier/_settings.py:141-146 (tag v9.15.1):

    return any(
        repository.startswith(_normalize(t))
        if t.endswith("/")
        else repository == _normalize(t)
        for t in trust
    )

_normalize only expands ~; it does not touch .. or collapse segments — copier/_settings.py:149-152 (tag v9.15.1):

def _normalize(url: str) -> str:
    if url.startswith("~"):  # Only expand on str to avoid messing with URLs
        url = expanduser(url)  # noqa: PTH111
    return url

This decision gates code execution — copier/_main.py:293 (tag v9.15.1):

        if self.unsafe or is_trusted_repository(self.settings.trust, self.template.url):
            return  # skip the unsafe-feature check entirely

The chain: the trust comparison sees the raw URL, so "https://github.com/safeorg/../evilorg/t.git".startswith("https://github.com/safeorg/") is True; but the value copier hands to git/pathlib is normalized, so the template actually loaded is evilorg/t (a different, attacker-owned org). Trust is granted to a location the user never trusted, and _check_unsafe returns early, so the malicious template's tasks execute with no prompt.

This is most acute on copier update, which reads _src_path from the project's .copier-answers.yml (copier/_subproject.py) — i.e. an attacker who hands you a project controls the URL that the trust check is applied to.

In-repo asymmetry that confirms the omission: copier consistently resolves paths everywhere else it makes a security decision — Path.resolve() plus is_relative_to(...) guards in _render_template, template_copy_root, and _external_data — but not in the trust comparison.

Self-contained standalone script; runs against a clean, pinned PyPI install via the real copier CLI only. Static by default (copier copy --pretend reaches the trust decision but does not execute tasks); --prove-exec is an opt-in supplementary run that fires an inert marker (echo + touch). The full poc.py accompanies this report.

Build and run:

python -m venv venv && . venv/bin/activate
pip install "copier==9.15.1"
python poc.py                # static proof (default)
python poc.py --prove-exec   # also fire the inert marker

Observed output (copier 9.15.1):

== version proof ==
  copier == 9.15.1
  module : .../site-packages/copier/__init__.py

== inputs ==
  trusted prefix (settings.yml): /tmp/copier_trust_poc_XXXX/trusted_templates/
  control src (canonical)      : /tmp/copier_trust_poc_XXXX/attacker/evil_template
  exploit src (traversal)      : /tmp/copier_trust_poc_XXXX/trusted_templates/../attacker/evil_template
  both resolve to the SAME dir : True
  exploit startswith trusted/  : True
  minimal delta                : exploit = '/tmp/copier_trust_poc_XXXX/trusted_templates/..' + '/attacker/evil_template'

== static proof (copier copy --pretend; payload NOT executed) ==
  control (canonical, untrusted): exit=4  -> BLOCKED (UnsafeTemplateError)
  exploit (trusted-prefix /..)  : exit=0  -> TRUSTED, task reached
  marker on disk after --pretend: False (expected False: --pretend does not run tasks)

  --- copier's own output for the exploit (note the task it WOULD run) ---
  | Copying from template version None
  |     create  hello.txt
  |  > Running task 1 of 1: echo COPIER-TRUST-BYPASS-RCE-MARKER && touch COPIER_RCE_PROOF

== VERDICT ==
  BYPASS CONFIRMED: identical template is refused by canonical path
  (exit 4) yet granted trust via '<trusted>/..' traversal (exit 0),
  so its tasks run with no --trust prompt.

== --prove-exec: running the exploit for real (inert marker) ==
  | COPIER-TRUST-BYPASS-RCE-MARKER
  |  > Running task 1 of 1: echo COPIER-TRUST-BYPASS-RCE-MARKER && touch COPIER_RCE_PROOF
  exit=0  marker file 'COPIER_RCE_PROOF' created: True
  -> ARBITRARY COMMAND EXECUTED via a 'trusted' template, no --trust

The exploit is the same template as the control plus the minimal delta <trusted_prefix>/... Deterministic: same input → same result. The PoC uses a local trusted prefix for a self-contained, network-free run; the https case is identical because git normalizes .. before the request — e.g. git ls-remote "https://github.com/copier-org/../pallets/flask.git" emits warning: redirecting to https://github.com/pallets/flask.git/ and returns pallets/flask's refs, a different org than the trusted copier-org/.

A user who has configured a trusted prefix (a trailing-/ entry in trust, a documented feature) no longer gets the unsafe-feature prompt for a template that merely appears to live under that prefix. Any party who can influence the template URL — most realistically the author of a project the victim runs copier update on, since _src_path comes from that project's .copier-answers.yml — can host the real template under a different org/location reached via .. and have its tasks/migrations/ jinja_extensions execute arbitrary commands with no prompt. It fires on a default, modern git for both local paths and https.

Proposed severity: High, comparable to the project's prior unsafe-template advisory (GHSA-3xw7-v6cj-5q8h). Proposed CVSS v4 vector (maintainer to finalize; AT:P reflects the required trusted-prefix configuration): CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H. Conservative variant if you scope impact to the user account only (no host escape claim): drop SC/SI/SA to N.

Normalize both sides before comparing, instead of raw startswith. For local entries, compare resolved absolute paths (Path(t).resolve() vs Path(repository).resolve()) using segment containment / is_relative_to, the pattern already used in _render_template and template_copy_root. For URL entries, parse the URL and reject or collapse .././empty path segments before the prefix test. As defense-in-depth, reject any _src_path read from an answers file that contains .. segments after the scheme/host, since legitimate template URLs never need them.

• CWE-22 — https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html
• CWE-94 — https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html
• Affected source (tag v9.15.1): copier/_settings.py:141-146 (prefix match),

copier/_settings.py:149-152 (_normalize), copier/_main.py:293 (trust gate).

• Documented prefix behavior: docs/settings.md ("Locations ending with /

will be matched as prefixes").

• https .. normalization: libcurl removes dot segments by default

(CURLOPT_PATH_AS_IS defaults to off) — https://curl.se/libcurl/c/CURLOPT_PATH_AS_IS.html

• Novelty: distinct from copier's published advisories, which concern filesystem

read/write traversal in rendered output; this is an authorization bypass in the trust setting's URL matching. The flawed match is identical between released v9.15.1 and current master HEAD, and unchanged since the