pypi package report

Is aiosmtplib safe?

2 known vulnerabilities, worst severity MODERATE.

// reach

5 direct dependencies

none carry a known advisory

    19 packages depend on it

    an advisory here reaches each of them

    Create a free accountfor every dependency path, dependent and what to upgrade
    // ai model usage

    No published models are known to use this package.


    cvss
    5.9
    medium

    CVSS v3.1 base score out of 10

    epss
    0.40%
    medium

    chance of exploitation in 30 days, 35th percentile of all CVEs

    xyz score
    not scored

    CyberXYZ composite out of 10

    fig. 01 — GHSA-vxj7-4xrp-5vr4, the advisory selected below

    // 2 advisories

    GHSA-vxj7-4xrp-5vr4

    MODERATEGitHub ratingCVE-2026-55558
    // impact

    When a connection is upgraded with STARTTLS, aiosmtplib reads the server's 220 go-ahead reply and immediately performs the TLS handshake without discarding any data still sitting in the receive buffer. Bytes the protocol read off the plaintext socket before the handshake survive across the plaintext→TLS boundary (the asyncio transport is swapped in place, so the protocol object and its buffer are reused), and are then parsed as though they had arrived inside the TLS session.

    Who is affected: Any caller that uses STARTTLS by passing start_tls=True or start_tls=None when the server advertises STARTTLS, and whose traffic can be intercepted by an active network attacker on the plaintext leg of the connection.

    A man in the middle can send, in a single segment immediately after the client's STARTTLS command, the 220 reply followed by attacker-chosen response lines (e.g. 220 Go ahead\r\n250-mx.evil\r\n250 AUTH LOGIN\r\n). aiosmtplib consumes only the 220, leaves the injected lines buffered, completes the handshake, and then parses the attacker's pre-staged plaintext as the first post-TLS server response. This also desynchronizes every subsequent command/response pair inside the "encrypted" session.

    Not affected: Connections using implicit/direct TLS (use_tls=True) have no plaintext phase and are not vulnerable. The attack requires an active man in the middle via network compromise; a passive eavesdropper cannot exploit it.

    // patches

    A fix is available in aiosmtplib 5.1.2. All earlier versions that support STARTTLS are affected; upgrade to 5.1.2 or later.

    The fix treats any data buffered after the 220 STARTTLS reply and before the handshake as a protocol violation, per RFC 3207 §4.2 ("the client MUST discard any knowledge obtained from the server … which was not obtained from the TLS negotiation itself").

    // workarounds

    If you cannot upgrade immediately:

    • Use implicit TLS instead of STARTTLS. Connect with use_tls=True. This removes the plaintext phase entirely.
    • If STARTTLS is unavoidable, restrict connections to servers reached over a trusted network path.
    // cvss v3.1 vector

    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

    Attack vector
    Network
    Attack complexity
    High
    Privileges required
    None
    User interaction
    None
    Scope
    Unchanged
    Confidentiality
    None
    Integrity
    High
    Availability
    None

    Checked 2026-11-07 at 22:55 UTC. The most recent advisory here was published 2026-08-27. Updated continuously from NVD, GHSA, OSV and CNA feeds.

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