packagist package report

Is symfony/lox24-notifier safe?

1 known vulnerability, worst severity MODERATE.

// reach

0 direct dependencies

none carry a known advisory

    0 packages depend on it

    dependents not yet indexed for this ecosystem

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      // ai model usage

      Tracked for PyPI packages. HuggingFace models declare Python dependencies, so packagist packages are not covered.


      cvss
      6.9
      medium

      CVSS v4.0 base score out of 10

      epss
      0.45%
      medium

      chance of exploitation in 30 days, 39th percentile of all CVEs

      xyz score
      not scored

      CyberXYZ composite out of 10

      fig. 01 — GHSA-64hg-93w9-fc35, the advisory selected below

      // 1 advisories

      GHSA-64hg-93w9-fc35

      MODERATEGitHub ratingCVE-2026-45754
      // description

      The Mailjet mailer bridge and the LOX24 SMS notifier bridge both ship webhook request parsers used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks each provider POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Their doParse(Request $request, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $secret) methods receive the configured webhook secret but never read it; they convert and return the payload unconditionally.

      As a result, an application that wires up either webhook endpoint accepts any POST to that URL, even when a webhook secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake bounce / blocked / spam / open / click / delivery events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.

      // resolution

      MailjetRequestParser::doParse() now rejects the request unless it carries the expected HTTP Basic credentials, Mailjet's webhook authentication mechanism, using a constant-time comparison. The configured webhook secret is matched against the credentials embedded in the Mailjet webhook URL as user:password (use :password when the URL has no username).

      Lox24RequestParser::doParse() now rejects the request unless it carries an X-LOX24-Token HTTP header whose value matches the configured secret, using a constant-time comparison. The same token must be configured in the LOX24 dashboard under the callback settings.

      When no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: webhook authentication remains opt-in, but it is now actually enforced once opted in.

      The Mailjet patch is available here for branch 6.4.

      The LOX24 patch is available here for branch 7.4 (the LOX24 bridge was introduced in 7.1 and is not present in 6.4).

      // credits

      Symfony would like to thank Himanshu Anand for reporting the issue, and Alexandre Daubois and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fixes.

      // cvss v4.0 vector

      CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

      Attack vector
      Network
      Attack complexity
      Low
      Attack requirements
      None
      Privileges required
      None
      User interaction
      None
      Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
      None
      Integrity (vulnerable system)
      Low
      Availability (vulnerable system)
      None
      Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
      None
      Integrity (subsequent systems)
      None
      Availability (subsequent systems)
      None

      Checked 2026-11-07 at 22:31 UTC. The most recent advisory here was published 2026-05-28. Updated continuously from NVD, GHSA, OSV and CNA feeds.

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