Is verdaccio-okta-oauth safe?

npm/verdaccio-okta-oauth is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. The package's preinstall script (node setup.mjs) downloads the Bun runtime from github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases (v1.3.13) into a temporary directory, extracts and chmods it, then invokes it against a sibling file math_init.js via execFileSync(bunBinary, [path.join(D, 'math_init.js')], {stdio:'inherit', cwd:D}). math_init.js is a single-line ~727 KB obfuscator.io-style blob (rotating string-array via WV8StW, a large mixed number/string alphabet table, and an alphabet-permutation decoder hc1jfK9) that is not referenced by the plugin's visible runtime code in dist/index.js. Fetching a second-language runtime at install time solely to execute an obfuscated sibling file is the alternate-runtime-dropper pattern — it smuggles the executed code into an alien runtime so Node-based tooling does not resolve it, and the obfuscation prevents static verification of what the payload does. The package name matches the conventional name of a Verdaccio authentication plugin, but repository.url points at github.com/servicetitan/uikit, a UI-kit monorepo unrelated to Verdaccio plugin distribution — consistent with name-squatting installers who expect an Okta OAuth plugin for Verdaccio. Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Reported by Amazon Inspector and GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.

Malicious

38.1.1, 38.1.2, 38.1.3, 38.1.4, 38.1.5, 38.1.6, 38.1.7, 38.1.8, 38.1.9, 38.1.10, 38.1.11, 38.1.12, 38.1.13, 38.1.14, 38.1.15, 38.1.16

Move to

38.3.1 newest 38.x release, no known advisory

40.2.2 current release, no known advisory

If one of these versions was installed, remove it and treat the credentials, tokens and SSH keys on that machine as exposed: rotate them. Check CI runners and container images that installed it too.

npm install verdaccio-okta-oauth@38.3.1

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