Is obsidian-tc safe ? 7 known vulnerabilities, worst severity CRITICAL.
// reach 0 direct dependencies
none carry a known advisory
0 packages depend on it
an advisory here reaches each of them
// ai model usage Tracked for PyPI packages. HuggingFace models declare Python dependencies, so npm packages are not covered.
cvss CVSS v3.1 base score out of 10
epss chance of exploitation in 30 days, 22nd percentile of all CVEs
xyz score CyberXYZ composite out of 10
fig. 01 — GHSA-84c9-qqpq-2pq5, the advisory selected below
// 7 advisories GHSA-84c9-qqpq-2pq5 Tool dispatch did not check the caller-supplied input.vault against the caller's bound vault (ctx.vaultId); the folder ACL was a single global instance and the JWT carried no vault claim. As a result, any valid token could read, write, or delete any configured vault by passing input.vault, defeating multi-tenant isolation across ~90 tool sites. (resources/read was the only surface that already gua CRIT GHSA-pqh8-4pj7-32xx The Streamable HTTP transport was constructed without enableDnsRebindingProtection/allowedHosts/allowedOrigins and performed no Origin-header validation. With the documented auth.mode: "none" loopback default, a drive-by web page could POST http://127.0.0.1/mcp and receive caller http-local with scopes ["*"] — full vault read/write — via DNS rebinding / a forged Origin. CRIT GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc On a Streamable HTTP deployment with auth.jwtSecret configured, serving a 2026-07-28-era client that declared elicitation.form support, a call to a dispatch-gated tool (destructive: true, or a scope with an HITL floor) that was offered an inputRequired confirmation could still complete after the human declined, cancelled, or the elicitation response was omitted or malformed, provided the client ec HIGH GHSA-r3g7-r4hr-m258 create_entity, link_entities, rename_entity, unlink_entities and delete_entity regenerate a memory note's body from SQLite at the computed memory/<type>/<name>.md path. When a note already existed at that path and was not owned by the entity being written (a hand-authored note, or an orphan left by a different entity whose name sanitized to the same path), its entire body was overwritten on the ne HIGH GHSA-c5xx-h28h-f682 ACL checks ran on the lexical vault-relative path while containment used the realpath. An in-vault symlink placed under an allowed glob, whose realpath resolved into a denied folder, passed the read ACL — an intra-vault read-ACL-scope bypass. It requires an out-of-band-planted symlink (no MCP tool creates one) and is not a vault-root escape. MODE GHSA-cvp8-vvgf-69q4 With a default configuration, an undefined readPaths/writePaths meant allow-all, the strictReadDefault flag was inert, and the .obsidian/.git/.trash control directories were denied only during enumeration — not on the direct request path. A caller could read .obsidian/plugins/*/data.json, exfiltrating plugin API keys and Obsidian Sync passwords (live-reproduced), as well as any other in-vault file MODE GHSA-43r2-c7g8-prc8 Bridge tool results filtered only the items array against the read ACL and passed sibling fields through unfiltered: tasks_filter emitted groups whose counts reflected denied notes, makemd_query returned ...result siblings, and list_templates enumerated Templater template paths and parsed user-function bodies with no read-whitelist gate. A caller could infer or read data from notes outside its rea MODE // impact Tool dispatch did not check the caller-supplied input.vault against the caller's bound vault (ctx.vaultId); the folder ACL was a single global instance and the JWT carried no vault claim. As a result, any valid token could read, write, or delete any configured vault by passing input.vault, defeating multi-tenant isolation across ~90 tool sites. (resources/read was the only surface that already guarded this.)
// patches Fixed in 1.3.1 (the fix was developed on the v1.3.0 tag, which never published to npm; 1.3.1 is the first published release with the fix). Upgrade to >= 1.3.1.
// workarounds Run a single vault per server process, or isolate each tenant on a separate process/credential.
// fix A central input.vault === ctx.vaultId guard was added in dispatch before the scope check.
// cvss v3.1 vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Attack vector Network
Attack complexity Low
Privileges required Low
User interaction None
Scope Changed
Confidentiality High
Integrity High
Availability High Checked 2026-10-24 at 20:10 UTC. The most recent advisory here was published 2026-10-23. Updated continuously from NVD, GHSA, OSV and CNA feeds.
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