npm package report

Is flatted safe?

2 known vulnerabilities, worst severity HIGH.

// reach

0 direct dependencies

none carry a known advisory

    27 packages depend on it

    an advisory here reaches each of them

    Create a free accountfor every dependency path, dependent and what to upgrade
    // ai model usage

    Tracked for PyPI packages. HuggingFace models declare Python dependencies, so npm packages are not covered.


    cvss
    9.8
    critical

    CVSS v3.1 base score out of 10; GitHub rates it HIGH

    epss
    0.84%
    medium

    chance of exploitation in 30 days, 58th percentile of all CVEs

    xyz score
    4.5
    medium

    CyberXYZ composite out of 10

    fig. 01 — GHSA-rf6f-7fwh-wjgh, the advisory selected below

    // 2 advisories

    GHSA-rf6f-7fwh-wjgh

    HIGHGitHub ratingCVE-2026-33228

    --- Summary

    The parse() function in flatted can use attacker-controlled string values from the parsed JSON as direct array index keys, without validating that they are numeric. Since the internal input buffer is a JavaScript Array, accessing it with the key "__proto__" returns Array.prototype via the inherited getter. This object is then treated as a legitimate parsed value and assigned as a property of the output object, effectively leaking a live reference to Array.prototype to the consumer. Any code that subsequently writes to that property will pollute the global prototype.

    --- Root Cause

    File: esm/index.js:29 (identical in cjs/index.js)

      const resolver = (input, lazy, parsed, $) => output => {
        for (let ke = keys(output), {length} = ke, y = 0; y < length; y++) {
          const k = ke[y];
          const value = output[k];    
          if (value instanceof Primitive) {
            const tmp = input[value];      // Bug is here

    No validation that value is a safe numeric index input is built as a plain Array. JavaScript's property lookup on arrays traverses the prototype chain for non-numeric keys. The key "__proto__" resolves to Array.prototype, which:

    • has type "object" → passes the typeof tmp === object guard at line 30
    • is not in the parsed Set yet → passes the !parsed.has(tmp) guard.
    • The reference to Array.prototype is then enqueued in lazy and later unconditionally assigned to the output object.

    --- Replication Steps

      const Flatted = require('flatted'); 
      const parsed = Flatted.parse('[{"x":"__proto__"}]');
      parsed.x.polluted = 'pwned';
      console.log([].polluted);  // Returns true

    --- Impact An attacker can supply a crafted flatted string to parse() that causes the returned object to hold a live reference to Array.prototype, enabling any downstream code that writes to that property to pollute the global prototype chain, potentially causing denial of service or code execution.

    Recommended solution Validate that the index string represents an integer within the bounds of input before accessing it:

    // Before (vulnerable) const tmp = input[value];

    // After (safe) const idx = +value; // coerce boxed String → number const tmp = (Number.isInteger(idx) && idx >= 0 && idx < input.length) ? input[idx] : undefined;

    // cvss v3.1 vector

    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

    Attack vector
    Network
    Attack complexity
    Low
    Privileges required
    None
    User interaction
    None
    Scope
    Unchanged
    Confidentiality
    High
    Integrity
    High
    Availability
    High

    Checked 2026-11-06 at 21:06 UTC. The most recent advisory here was published 2026-03-19. Updated continuously from NVD, GHSA, OSV and CNA feeds.

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