Applications that pass unsanitized user input (e.g. parsed JSON request bodies, database records, or config files from untrusted sources) as the first argument to defu() are vulnerable to prototype pollution.
A crafted payload containing a __proto__ key can override intended default values in the merged result:
import { defu } from 'defu'
const userInput = JSON.parse('{"__proto__":{"isAdmin":true}}')
const config = defu(userInput, { isAdmin: false })
config.isAdmin // true — attacker overrides the server default// root causeThe internal _defu function used Object.assign({}, defaults) to copy the defaults object. Object.assign invokes the __proto__ setter, which replaces the resulting object's [[Prototype]] with attacker-controlled values. Properties inherited from the polluted prototype then bypass the existing __proto__ key guard in the for...in loop and land in the final result.
// fixReplace Object.assign({}, defaults) with object spread ({ ...defaults }), which uses [[DefineOwnProperty]] and does not invoke the __proto__ setter.
// affected versions<= 6.1.4
// creditsReported by @BlackHatExploitation
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None