npm package report

Is @backstage/plugin-auth-node safe?

1 known vulnerability, worst severity MODERATE.

// reach

0 direct dependencies

none carry a known advisory

    0 packages depend on it

    an advisory here reaches each of them

      Create a free accountfor every dependency path, dependent and what to upgrade
      // ai model usage

      Tracked for PyPI packages. HuggingFace models declare Python dependencies, so npm packages are not covered.


      cvss
      0.0
      medium

      severity out of 10

      epss
      not scored

      chance of exploitation in 30 days

      xyz score
      not scored

      CyberXYZ composite out of 10

      fig. 01 — GHSA-xm5q-p7w3-x6cp, the advisory selected below

      // 1 advisories

      GHSA-xm5q-p7w3-x6cp

      MODERATECVE-2026-106460
      // impact

      Several Passport-based authentication providers use shared OAuth profile normalization from @backstage/plugin-auth-node. Affected versions may pass an email to email-based sign-in resolvers even when verification metadata supplied for that same address is explicitly negative. The ID-token-only fallback likewise did not consistently respect emailverified: false.

      Exploitation requires a deployment where an admitted identity-provider user can supply or change an email address without verification and Backstage uses that profile email to resolve catalog identities. In that configuration, the user may be able to assume another catalog identity and obtain its associated access and permissions.

      An absent emailverified claim is not by itself considered an affected condition. Some providers rely on authoritative organizational provisioning and intentionally omit the optional claim. Operators using email-based sign-in resolution must ensure that the configured provider restricts sign-in to the intended user population and supplies an authoritative email address, either through provider verification or trusted immutable provisioning.

      This advisory covers the shared Passport profile normalization path when the selected profile email itself carries verified: false, when a matching raw provider email carries emailverified: false, or when an email obtained only from an ID token carries emailverified: false. It does not apply verification metadata from a different address or from a separate ID token to an independently fetched provider-profile email.

      The generic OIDC provider follows a separate profile transform and is covered by GHSA-826h-28h9-65hg. The two advisories are complementary; deployments using both affected paths should apply both package updates. VMware Cloud uses a separate custom token transformation and is not changed by this patch.

      // patches

      Fixed in @backstage/plugin-auth-node versions 0.6.15 and 0.7.5. Users remaining on the 0.6.x line should upgrade to at least 0.6.15; users on 0.7.x should upgrade to at least 0.7.5.

      The patched packages were released with Backstage v1.49.7 and Backstage v1.54.7, respectively. The fix is also present on master in commit 507e65a.

      // workarounds
      • Require the identity provider to verify user-controlled email addresses before allowing sign-in.
      • Ensure profile emails are immutable and provisioned from a trusted organizational source.
      • Use a sign-in resolver that does not depend on the profile email.
      • Use a custom profile transform that omits an email when matching provider metadata explicitly marks it as unverified.
      // cvss v3.1 vector

      CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

      Attack vector
      Network
      Attack complexity
      High
      Privileges required
      Low
      User interaction
      None
      Scope
      Unchanged
      Confidentiality
      High
      Integrity
      High
      Availability
      None

      Checked 2026-10-08 at 00:18 UTC. The most recent advisory here was published 2026-10-07. Updated continuously from NVD, GHSA, OSV and CNA feeds.

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