npm package report

Is @rhinostone/swig-core safe?

1 known vulnerability, worst severity HIGH.

// reach

0 direct dependencies

none carry a known advisory

    0 packages depend on it

    an advisory here reaches each of them

      Create a free accountfor every dependency path, dependent and what to upgrade
      // ai model usage

      Tracked for PyPI packages. HuggingFace models declare Python dependencies, so npm packages are not covered.

      cvss
      0.0
      high

      severity band, no base score published

      epss
      not scored

      chance of exploitation in 30 days

      xyz score
      not scored

      CyberXYZ composite out of 10

      fig. 01 — GHSA-2mf3-mr2r-r4vf, the advisory selected below

      // 1 advisories

      GHSA-2mf3-mr2r-r4vf

      HIGH
      // overview

      @rhinostone/swig is a maintained fork of the abandoned swig template engine and inherited the directory-traversal vulnerability tracked upstream as CVE-2023-25345 / GHSA-2rq5-699j-x7p6. The {% include %}, {% extends %}, and {% import %} tags resolve their target path through the filesystem loader without confining the result to the configured template root. A path that traverses upward (../) escapes the root and reads an arbitrary file from the host filesystem, whose contents are emitted into the rendered output.

      // attack scenario

      The dangerous case does not require the attacker to control template source — only template data (the locals passed at render time). An application that renders a trusted template whose include / extends path is variable-driven is exposed:

      // application code — a configured filesystem loader with a basepath
swig.renderFile('page.html', { partial: req.query.partial });
      {# page.html — trusted template #}
{% include partial %}

      Setting ?partial=../../../../etc/passwd makes the loader resolve and read that file, and its contents are rendered into the response. A literal in trusted source is equally affected: {% include "../../../etc/passwd" %}.

      // impact

      Arbitrary local file disclosure (confidentiality). An attacker able to influence an include / extends / import path — directly, or via untrusted locals — can read files outside the template directory: application configuration, credentials, source code, /etc/passwd, and so on. There is no integrity or availability impact.

      // affected & patched

      Every published version up to and including 2.7.0 is affected — @rhinostone/swig, and the shared @rhinostone/swig-core loader, hence @rhinostone/swig-twig, @rhinostone/swig-jinja2, and @rhinostone/swig-django as well.

      Fixed in 2.7.1: the filesystem loader now rejects any include / extends / import path that resolves outside the configured basepath root, including paths supplied through an untrusted runtime variable. A new allowOutsideRoot loader option is available for the rare case of intentionally reading files from outside the root.

      Upgrade to 2.7.2 or later: 2.7.1 fixed the vulnerability but introduced a regression — a relative basepath wrongly rejected every in-root template path. 2.7.2 resolves the basepath to an absolute path before the check and restores correct in-root resolution.

      // workarounds
      • Upgrade to 2.7.2 (or later).
      • If you cannot upgrade immediately: configure the filesystem loader with an explicit basepath, and never pass untrusted data into an {% include %} / {% extends %} / {% import %} path.
      // references

      Checked 2026-09-26 at 01:04 UTC. The most recent advisory here was published 2026-08-18. Updated continuously from NVD, GHSA, OSV and CNA feeds.

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