This advisory covers the deprecated fabric-sdk-java client SDK. Channel.java implements readObject() and exposes deSerializeChannel() which call ObjectInputStream.readObject() on untrusted byte arrays without configuring an ObjectInputFilter. This is the classic Java deserialization RCE pattern.
Note: fabric-sdk-java is deprecated and maintained in https://github.com/hyperledger/fabric-sdk-java. Filing here as that repo does not have private vulnerability reporting enabled.
// affected code// src/main/java/org/hyperledger/fabric/sdk/Channel.java
private void readObject(ObjectInputStream in) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {
in.defaultReadObject(); // No ObjectInputFilter configured
}
public Channel deSerializeChannel(byte[] channelBytes)
throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException, InvalidArgumentException {
ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(channelBytes));
Channel channel = (Channel) ois.readObject(); // Untrusted bytes deserialized
return channel;
}// attack vectorAn attacker who can supply crafted serialized Channel bytes to the client application — for example, by compromising a local channel file, injecting data through an application that accepts Channel bytes from external sources, or exploiting a separate write primitive — can achieve RCE via gadget chain exploitation when deSerializeChannel() processes those bytes. The risk is highest in deployments that accept Channel data from sources outside the client's direct control. Note: channel data is not transmitted from Fabric peers; this is a client-side deserialization surface.
// proof of concept// Generate malicious payload with ysoserial:
// java -jar ysoserial.jar CommonsCollections6 "touch /tmp/pwned" > malicious_channel.ser
// Victim code:
byte[] maliciousBytes = Files.readAllBytes(Paths.get("malicious_channel.ser"));
Channel channel = client.deSerializeChannel(maliciousBytes); // RCE fires here// notes on deprecationfabric-sdk-java is deprecated as of Hyperledger Fabric v2.5 (replaced by org.hyperledger.fabric:fabric-gateway). However, organizations that have not yet migrated remain fully exposed. Automated dependency scanners (Snyk, Dependabot) cannot alert users without a published GHSA. This advisory is filed to ensure those users are notified and directed to migrate.
// fixFor the deprecated SDK: add ObjectInputFilter to whitelist only expected classes:
ObjectInputFilter filter = ObjectInputFilter.Config.createFilter(
"org.hyperledger.fabric.sdk.*;java.util.*;java.lang.*;!*"
);
ois.setObjectInputFilter(filter);The recommended remediation is migration to org.hyperledger.fabric:fabric-gateway, which does not use Java serialization.
// resources- CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data
- Migration guide: https://hyperledger.github.io/fabric-gateway/
Found by Martin Brodeur (brodmart) via independent security research.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- None
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- High
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- High
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- High
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None