blaze-server can merge HTTP/1.1 chunked-body trailer fields into Request.headers. Because trailer fields are attacker-controlled, an unauthenticated remote client can inject arbitrary header names/values (e.g. X-Forwarded-For, internal-auth headers) that a fronting proxy sanitized from the request-header section, bypassing header-based trust decisions in the application.
// impactAny http4s application using BlazeServerBuilder over HTTP/1.1 whose routes or middleware trust proxy-set headers (e.g., X-Forwarded-For, X-Real-IP, X-Forwarded-Host, org-internal auth headers) is affected. Where a fronting proxy strips/normalizes those headers but forwards chunked bodies with trailers intact, an attacker can spoof client IP for allow-lists/rate-limits/audit, forge the https scheme, or inject internal-auth headers. A promoted Connection: close trailer is also honored, allowing attacker-controlled termination of pooled backend connections.
// workaroundsDeploy behind a proxy that removes trailer fields (or rejects requests that use trailers) before forwarding; until patched, avoid trust decisions based on headers that a proxy is relied upon to sanitize.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None