maven package report

Is com.quietterminal:qti-neon safe?

1 known vulnerability, worst severity HIGH.

// reach

0 direct dependencies

none carry a known advisory

    0 packages depend on it

    an advisory here reaches each of them

      Create a free accountfor every dependency path, dependent and what to upgrade
      // ai model usage

      Tracked for PyPI packages. HuggingFace models declare Python dependencies, so maven packages are not covered.


      cvss
      0.0
      high

      severity out of 10

      epss
      0.00%
      medium

      chance of exploitation in 30 days, 38th percentile of all CVEs

      xyz score
      0.0
      low

      CyberXYZ composite out of 10

      fig. 01 — GHSA-85rg-p3fr-xc2f, the advisory selected below

      // 1 advisories

      GHSA-85rg-p3fr-xc2f

      HIGHCVE-2026-54609
      // impact

      The relay's reconnect handler forwards every RECONNECTREQUEST to the host without deduplication or a size cap on the pendingReconnects map, unlike the connect flow which guards against this with maxPendingConnections. An unauthenticated attacker who knows a valid session ID can send RECONNECTREQUEST packets from many spoofed source addresses; each packet that passes the session lookup is forwarded to the host as a new reconnect attempt. Because the per-source rate limiter assigns a fresh token bucket to each spoofed IP, it provides no protection. The host receives one forwarded packet per spoofed source per cleanup cycle, making the relay an amplification vector for denial-of-service against the host. The host's real address is never exposed to clients by design, so this is the primary viable DoS path against it. A secondary issue: once more than maxRateLimiters spoofed IPs are seen, performCleanup calls rateLimiters.clear(), resetting rate limit state for all sources including legitimate ones.

      Affected: NeonRelay in all three implementations (Java, Python, TypeScript).

      // patches

      Not yet patched. Fix consists of three changes to handleReconnectRequest in each implementation:

      • Reject the request if pendingReconnects.size() >= maxPendingConnections (mirrors the existing connect-flow guard)
      • Only forward to the host if the sessionId:clientId key is not already present in pendingReconnects — the map entry can still be updated with the new source address, but the host only needs to validate once per slot
      • In performCleanup, evict throttled entries before falling back to rateLimiters.clear() to avoid resetting legitimate sources' rate limit state
      // workarounds

      Operators can partially mitigate by placing the relay behind a network-level filter that drops packets with spoofed source addresses (BCP38/uRPF). This does not address the missing pendingReconnects size cap or the rateLimiters.clear() issue but eliminates the amplification path in most deployment environments.

      // references
      • PROTOCOL.md — reconnect flow
      • ARCHITECTURE.md — reconnect handshake detail (step 4 describes the unbounded put)
      // cvss v3.1 vector

      CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H

      Attack vector
      Network
      Attack complexity
      Low
      Privileges required
      None
      User interaction
      None
      Scope
      Changed
      Confidentiality
      None
      Integrity
      None
      Availability
      High

      Checked 2026-10-04 at 01:17 UTC. The most recent advisory here was published 2026-07-28. Updated continuously from NVD, GHSA, OSV and CNA feeds.

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