go package report

Is github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend/v2 safe?

2 known vulnerabilities, worst severity HIGH.

// reach

0 direct dependencies

none carry a known advisory

    0 packages depend on it

    an advisory here reaches each of them

      Create a free accountfor every dependency path, dependent and what to upgrade
      // ai model usage

      Tracked for PyPI packages. HuggingFace models declare Python dependencies, so go packages are not covered.


      cvss
      0.0
      high

      severity out of 10

      epss
      not scored

      chance of exploitation in 30 days

      xyz score
      0.0
      low

      CyberXYZ composite out of 10

      fig. 01 — GHSA-pw5q-rjx4-7f7p, the advisory selected below

      // 2 advisories

      GHSA-pw5q-rjx4-7f7p

      HIGHCVE-2026-96627
      // summary

      A user holding the delegated users:update permission can reset the global administrator's password and take over the admin account. UpdateUser sets the target user's PasswordHash from the request body for ANY target with no comparison of caller-vs-target privilege. Because role assignment and role CRUD are deliberately gated by RequireGlobalAdmin, users:update is intended to sit BELOW admin (profile management); this finding defeats that separation.

      // root cause

      UpdateUser (handler backend/api/handlers/users.go:317-323) loads the target by ID and sets userModel.PasswordHash from the request body for any user, then userService.UpdateUser (userservice.go:174) simply tx.Saves — with NO actor-vs-target privilege comparison. The only IsGlobalAdmin guard (userservice.go:345) is a last-admin check inside DeleteUser, not the update path. Role assignment / role CRUD are RequireGlobalAdmin (backend/pkg/authz/permissions.go:27-33), proving users:update is intended below admin.

      // impact

      Complete administrator account takeover (C:H/I:H/A:H) by any holder of the delegated users:update permission.

      // proof of concept
      • Admin delegates a custom "User Manager" role with users:update.
      • PUT /users/{adminId} with {"password":"attacker123"}.
      • POST /auth/login {"username":"arcane","password":"attacker123"} → admin session.
      // attack chain
      • Action: admin delegates custom role with users:update. Guard: role creation is RequireGlobalAdmin. Bypass: intended delegation (holder is meant to manage profiles, not seize admin).
      • Action: PUT /users/{adminId} {"password":"attacker123"}. Guard: RequirePermission(users:update) (users.go:154). Bypass: holder has it; no hierarchy check (users.go:317-323, userservice.go:174 unconditional Save).
      • Action: POST /auth/login as admin → admin session.
      // bypass evidence
      • users.go:317-323 sets PasswordHash for any target; userservice.go:174-194 has no actor/target privilege comparison.
      • Only IsGlobalAdmin hits are DeleteUser's last-admin guard and DTO flags (grep).
      • users:update is org-level, held by no built-in non-admin role (permissions.go:24).
      // affected versions

      <= 2.5.0.

      Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use

      // cvss v3.1 vector

      CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

      Attack vector
      Network
      Attack complexity
      Low
      Privileges required
      Low
      User interaction
      None
      Scope
      Unchanged
      Confidentiality
      High
      Integrity
      High
      Availability
      High

      Checked 2026-10-17 at 08:04 UTC. The most recent advisory here was published 2026-10-16. Updated continuously from NVD, GHSA, OSV and CNA feeds.

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