go package report

Is github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets safe?

1 known vulnerability, worst severity MODERATE.

// reach

0 direct dependencies

none carry a known advisory

    0 packages depend on it

    an advisory here reaches each of them

      Create a free accountfor every dependency path, dependent and what to upgrade
      // ai model usage

      Tracked for PyPI packages. HuggingFace models declare Python dependencies, so go packages are not covered.


      cvss
      0.0
      medium

      severity out of 10

      epss
      0.00%
      low

      chance of exploitation in 30 days, 28th percentile of all CVEs

      xyz score
      0.0
      low

      CyberXYZ composite out of 10

      fig. 01 — GHSA-465p-v42x-3fmj, the advisory selected below

      // 1 advisories

      GHSA-465p-v42x-3fmj

      MODERATECVE-2026-22728

      This report shows a scope-widening issue in the rotate (re-encrypt) flow: the output scope can be derived from untrusted spec.template.metadata.annotations on the input sealed secret.

      If a victim sealed secret is strict- or namespace-scoped, an attacker who can submit it to the rotate endpoint can set sealedsecrets.bitnami.com/cluster-wide=true in the template metadata and receive a rotated sealed secret that is cluster-wide, enabling retargeting (metadata.name/metadata.namespace) and unsealing to recover the victim plaintext.

      // relevant links (pinned)// root cause

      The rotate flow unseals the input sealed secret to a Secret, then reseals using NewSealedSecret(..., secret).

      Because SecretScope(secret) is computed from secret annotations, and unsealing applies spec.template metadata onto the unsealed secret, an attacker can influence the scope of the rotated output by mutating template annotations on the rotate input.

      // attack path
      • Attacker obtains a victim SealedSecret object (for example via read access to resources or logs) and can submit it to the controller rotate endpoint.
      • Attacker sets spec.template.metadata.annotations.sealedsecrets.bitnami.com/cluster-wide=true (and optionally retargets name/namespace fields).
      • Rotate returns a resealed, cluster-wide sealed secret that is no longer bound to the victim name/namespace.
      • Attacker unseals the rotated output in their chosen namespace/name to recover the victim plaintext.
      // proof of concept

      Setup + run:

      unzip poc.zip -d poc
      cd poc
      make test

      Canonical output (excerpt):

      [CALLSITE_HIT]: pkg/apis/sealedsecrets/v1alpha1/sealedsecret_expansion.go:112 SecretScope
      [PROOF_MARKER]: scope_widened=true rotated_scope=cluster-wide

      Control output (excerpt):

      [NC_MARKER]: scope_widened=false strict_scope_preserved=true
      // fix accepted when

      Rotate preserves the original sealing scope and does not allow scope widening based on untrusted template metadata; strict or namespace-wide inputs cannot produce cluster-wide outputs.

      poc.zip PRDESCRIPTION.md attackscenario.md

      // cvss v3.1 vector

      CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

      Attack vector
      Network
      Attack complexity
      Low
      Privileges required
      High
      User interaction
      None
      Scope
      Unchanged
      Confidentiality
      High
      Integrity
      None
      Availability
      None

      Checked 2026-09-27 at 21:37 UTC. The most recent advisory here was published 2026-02-26. Updated continuously from NVD, GHSA, OSV and CNA feeds.

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