// summary
The server trusts all reverse-proxy headers by default, so any remote client can spoof X-Forwarded-For to bypass IP-based protections (AllowIPs, API IP whitelist, “localhost-only” checks). All IP-based access control becomes ineffective.
// details- Gin is created with defaults (gin.Default()), which sets TrustedProxies = 0.0.0.0/0 and uses X-Forwarded-For/X-Real-IP to compute ClientIP().
- IP-based controls rely on ClientIP():
- AllowIPs / BindDomain (core/middleware/iplimit.go, core/utils/security/security.go).
- API IP whitelist (core/middleware/apiauth.go).
- "localhost-only" checks that depend on ClientIP().
- Because no trusted-proxy range is enforced, any client can send X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1 (or a whitelisted IP) and be treated as coming from that address.
All IP-based access control is rendered ineffective: remote clients can masquerade as localhost or any whitelisted IP, defeating AllowIPs, API IP whitelists, and “localhost-only” protections.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None